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A Worsening Situation? 
Apartheid in South Africa has never been under greater threat. The current 
unrest, which is generally considered to date back to 1984, does not seem to be of the 
transient nature that many observers predicted. The death toll mounts at an increasing 
rate (1) and civil war, more than ever before, seems imminent. Against this backdrop, 
the pressure in the UK for substantial economic sanctions against South Africa has 
reached an unprecedented level. Public opinion would appear to be in favour (2), 
especially in the light of recent Government support for actions against Libya. The 
Government is also under pressure from the opposition parties, the UN, the 
Commonwealth - some countries have even spoken of leaving the Commonwealth if 
further sanctions are not applied (3) - and, to a lesser extent, the EEC (European 
Economic Community). 
Many refer to a worsening situation in South Africa. And an expressed desire by 
some for the alleviation of this does not always hide an underlying self-interest, 
especially when such apparently compassionate statements are made alongside criticisms 
of further sanctions. Others view the situation with optimism. While deeply regretting 
the seemingly inevitable loss of life, they believe they are witnessing the death throes of 
apartheid and the heralding of a majority rule South Africa. 
It is not appropriate for this paper to speculate on the exact timing of the demise 
of apartheid; current events may too easily color objective assessment. Nor should it 
make what is essentially a value judgement on the desirability of an end to apartheid at 
the cost of many lives. This demands taking a position on ends and means and makes 
the possibly contentious assumption that peaceful change in South Africa is not possible. 
However, it will be assumed that the end of apartheid is close at hand; that is, likely 
within the next five years. And, moreover, that this will be achieved largely through 
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violent coercion of the South African authorities, as it is at least the (reported) 
perception of many blacks within South Africa that the Government’s intransigence 
precludes a peaceful solution. 
This paper examines the prospects for business in South Africa within these 
parameters. It thereby considers the role of business in apartheid, the arguments for and 
against economic sanctions on South Africa, including their costs and the constructive 
engagement argument, and the challenges to be faced by business up to and after the 
end of apartheid. A UK perspective is adopted. 
Business and Abartheid 
Apartheid in South Africa is a highly charged issue. It is also a complex issue 
and one that has remained exceptionally prominent since the Sharpeville shootings in 
1960. Even before the current unrest, hardly a day would pass without some reference 
in the UK press to oppression in South Africa. The South African Government, in a 
series of advertisements in the national pr in the UK in 1983, commented: “South 
Africa arouses more controversy than almost any other country in the world.” Its 
motivations in running this campaign and pointing to this controversy aside, the 
observation is acceptable as accurate. In looking at how the West gains from apartheid 
and the role of business in this, it is necessary to first examine the nature of apartheid 
itself. This examination is based on many sources, including an interview with the 
Commercial Minister at the South African Embassy in London (4). 
Apartheid is an Afrikaans word meaning separateness or segregation. It has long 
been used by the South African government to describe its policy of pursuing the 
separate development of the races in South Africa, though it is arguable that, as ‘grand 
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apartheid’, the policy has now been largely abandoned. It was, at least, followed by the 
National Party after it came to power in 1948 and particularly after it was formally 
established under Dr Verwoerd, known as the ‘architect’ of apartheid, Prime Minister 
from 1958 till his assassination in 1966. Many, though, would suggest apartheid’s origins 
go back a lot further, to the Land Act of 1913, which established the Native Reserves, 
and even to British colonial rule prior to the Act of Union in 1910. 
Apartheid is also considered to mean institutionalised racism. Oliver Tambo, 
President of the African National Congress (ANC), has described it as “the sum total of 
all the policies, stratagems and methods, beliefs and attitudes that have been marshalled 
and are being employed in an attempt to ensure and entrench the political domination 
and economic exploitation of the African people by the white minority.” While Nobel 
prize winner Bishop Desmond Tutu, in reference to the oppression of the black 
population in South Africa, has said: “When the missionaries first came to Africa they 
had the Bible and we had the land. They said ‘let us pray’. We closed our eyes. When 
we opened them, we had the Bible and they had the land.” 
This implication of colonialism, however, and any suggestion that the white 
population has less of a claim to the land in South Africa than the blacks, would be 
swiftly denied by white South Africans. The South Africa Yearbook, produced by the 
South African Government, describes both the whites and blacks in South Africa as 
being descendants of immigrants. The only indigenous people of South Africa being the 
Bushmen (San), now “numerically insignificant.” It suggests the (Bantu-speaking) blacks 
of South Africa are the descendants of Iron-Age farmers who arrived from central 
Africa in the 11 th and 12th centuries. The whites being the descendants of 17th and 
18th century settlers, particularly the Afrikaners whose largely Dutch and German ethnic 
composition dates back to the Dutch administration of the Cape originating with Van 
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Riebeeck in 1652. This perspective is emphasised in history lessons in South Africa’s 
schools. 
It is the ethnic diversity of South Africa and the requirement to defend the 
claims of minority groups (including, of course, the whites) that provides the official 
rationale for apartheid. Government statistics put the population at just under 24 
million in 1980 (excluding Venda, Bophuthatswana and Transkei). Within this there are 
many different ethnic groups, the Yearbook lists nine ethnic divisions to South Africa’s 
black population of just under 16 million. The whites number about 44 million, the 
coloreds, 2f million, and the Asians 3/4 million. This heterogeneity inspires the policy 
of separate development, apartheid. South Africans claim the West does not understand 
South Africa’s situation and especially this racial complexity. Accordingly, while 
Western critics view separate development as racist, particularly given the West’s 
approach of integration to ethnic differences, many white South Africans argue that 
separate development is necessary for South Africa’s situation. 
The far greater diversity of South Africa is not the only reasno for President 
Botha saying the West does not understand “the realities of the subcontinent,” the West is 
also criticised for judging South Africa by Western standards when it forms part of the 
Third World. Separate development is defended because of the differences between the 
various groups in South Africa but most notably the differences in ‘sophistication’. 
Pointing to Zimbabwe, many white South Africans suggest that majority rule in an 
integrated South Africa would mean ‘tribalism would out’. The Zulus, the largest group 
in South Africa (6 million), are particularly feared. 
South Africa’s solution to the problem it identifies of ethnic diversity and the 
potential threat of continual inter-racial violence under an integrated South Africa, is a 
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confederation of states. This is known as ‘grand apartheid’. Separate development 
involves the blacks living outside white South Africa, ultimately all within ten states. 
These were formally the Native Reserves, which the Government has now designated as 
‘homelands’ (or Bantustans). If ‘grand apartheid’ were to be realised, there would be no 
black South Africans. The homelands would be independent - and Venda, 
Bophuthatswana, Transkei and Ciskei are already ‘independent’ (but no country other 
than South Africa recognises this). 
So apartheid is purportedly a system whereby the many races of South Africa 
may coexist securely and separately, different but equal. Yet it is in effect a racist 
ideology advancing separate development to maintain the economic exploitation of the 
black majority. Ideologies serve to explain the world to their adherents but in a way 
that justifies their interests. Many whites in South Africa still believe the differences 
between the races demands their separateness, each in the land which ‘belongs’ to them. 
In its extreme form, this belief finds its expression in support for the parties of the far 
right in South Africa as, for instance, in the recent rise to prominence of Eugene Terre’ 
Blanche and the Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweging (AWB). Other whites reject this view 
but are not willing to accept or are frightened of the consequences of an integrated 
South Africa under majority rule. 
Black leaders reject all arguments about ethnic differences between the blacks. 
They see themselves as black first and foremost and it is noted that the South African 
authorities make and encourage the divisions, including, through the use of vigilantes, 
the fighting between blacks which characterises much of the current unrest. Apartheid 
cannot be accepted as simply a solution to a problem of ethnic diversity as an alternative 
to integration, And it is more than overt racial discrimination. It is fundamentally 
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about economic exploitation. This is where business is involved and why corporate 
involvement in South AFrica is widely condemned. 
The homelands represent only 13% of the country’s land mass - including some 
of the poorest land in the country - yet they are (or were) intended to contain 73% of 
South Africa’s population. Every black already has a homeland and consequently, in 
response to the criticism that the blacks are completely without political rights, the 
Government responds that they have political rights in their ‘independent’ homelands. 
However, only about half (12- 13 million) actually live in the homelands, many have not 
seen their homeland and will probably never do so. Despite a policy of repatriation - 
the forced removal to these homelands - the Government recognises that a large 
proportion of blacks will remain in the townships. The size of the black urban 
population is dictated by economic requirements, for apartheid in its effect if not its 
design means the creation of a migratory labor system. Under such a system cheap labor 
is used as and when required without the disadvantages of ‘having to put up with it’ in 
the community. 
Apartheid involves even the urban blacks (and the coloreds and Asians for that 
matter) living outside white South Africa. The Group Areas Act provides for the 
different racial groups to live in separate areas. Accordingly, the urban blacks live in 
townships - many of which are shanty towns - on the edges of the cities. Soweto, for 
example, is a township of l$ million people south west of Johannesburg. If the white 
town is close enough to a homeland for workers to be able to commute, the Government 
disestablishes the old black township beside the white town, moving the people to a 
township in the homeland. As well as residential areas, facilities such as beaches, 
cinemas and state schools are also segregated. The myriad of laws which ensure 
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separation, and their brutal enforcement, gives rise to the description of apartheid as 
institutionalised racism. 
South Africa is extremely prosperous by African standards, its current troubles 
notwithstanding. This prosperity is built upon an economic dependence on the blacks. 
It has long been claimed that it is this dependence, which continues to grow and 
particularly now in its demands for skilled workers (including middle managers), that 
will bring an end to apartheid. It is estimated that by the year 2000 the black 
population in South Africa will be 37 million but the white population only 6 million. 
Already, job reservation for whites has ended due to recruitment difficulties. Continued 
growth will mean greater economic incorporation of the blacks. With this, it is argued, 
political and social incorporation cannot but follow. In other words, apartheid as a 
means primarily for economic exploitation, but which also involves social and political 
exclusion, will be destroyed through economic progress. 
This perspective, however, no longer satisfies many opponents of apartheid. 
While the average black is materially better off than most of his or her counterparts 
elsewhere in Africa, this does not compensate for the absence of political rights and the 
great disparity between blacks and whites, with the latter having probably the highest 
standard of living in the world. Little real progress is evident; few reforms have been 
more than cosmetic, despite Botha’s “adapt or die” slogan. The current economic 
problems of South Africa can only exacerbate the situation. The armed seizure of state 
political power by the ANC and economic sanctions applied by the outside world to 
hasten the defeat of the government are viewed by many as the only means of ending 
apartheid. At the very least, those advocating further sanctions are seeking more rapid 
change in South Africa than its Government seems prepared to concede. 
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It has been suggested that South Africa’s apartheid system has always been a 
mutually beneficial alliance between a minority government and private business; that 
there is a convergence of interest between business in South Africa and the upholders of 
apartheid. The basis for this, as indicated above, is apartheid’s role in the provision of 
cheap labor, particularly in establishing a migratory labor system, and in the grossly 
unequal apportionment of the country’s wealth. The International Labour Organisation 
(ILO) has described apartheid as “a system of forced labour.” Efficient use of this labor 
resource has demanded capital investment which has come from the West. South 
Africa’s development has consistently involved the combination of cheap labor and 
Western capital, from the late 19th century when British settlers such as Cecil Rhodes 
first started large-scale mining of diamonds and gold, to more recent times and the 
creation of South Africa’s now quite substantial manufacturing base. Business - and 
British business in particular - has long been implicated in apartheid. 
Of course, Western businesses operate in other countries characterised by 
oppression, exploitation and great differences in wealth. However, none of these 
countries are as extreme as South Africa and operate as overtly. Nor do they wish to be 
considered as part of the West - a (white) South African aspiration - but not be judged 
by Western standards and values. Moreover, corporate activity in other unsavoury 
countries should also be held up to scrutiny and South Africa is symbolic in this respect. 
Calling attention to the wrongs of South Africa and corporate involvement in them, 
highlights other less noticeable wrongs elsewhere. But if they are not addressed in South 
Africa why should they be addressed in other countries? 
South Africa is dependent on Western capital. Recognition of this gives support 
to the calls for economic sanctions against South Africa. However, Western capital is 
also dependent on South Africa. Both benefit from apartheid. This complexity 
underlies demands for sanctions and affects the likelihood of their imposition. 
Sanctions against South Africa 
Arnt Spandau, Professor of Business Economics at Witwatersrand University, 
Johannesburg, suggests “trade is the most important life-line” of South Africa (5). The 
Yearbook also recognises the importance of trade to the South African economy. It 
refers to a “great but declining dependence on external trade” (the decline is due to the 
expansion of domestic consumer markets). Among Western countries, in 1980, South 
Africa occupied 15th position in the value of imports and exports of merchandise, while 
the total reciprocal flow of goods and services between South Africa and, the rest of the 
world amounted to 63% of South Africa’s GDP - described by the Yearbook as “one of 
the highest proportions in the Western world.” In 1981, 14.4% of South Africa’s exports 
were to the USA, 13.6% to Japan, 11.8% to the United Kingdom, and 22.5% to the rest 
of the EEC. Less than 10% were to Africa (6). Later figures put, in order of size, the 
US, Japan, Switzerland, the UK, and West Germany as South Africa’s largest export 
markets, worth around five billion dollars (7). 
Western investment in South Africa is substantial and, until most recently, 
continued to grow; much of it is British and American. Jesse Jackson has commented 
“The US and Britain, which consider themselves to be the crown jewels of democracy, in 
fact have the heaviest investment in South Africa. South Africa could not exist in its 
system of apartheid without the propping up from the US and Britain,” Britain is by far 
the largest single foreign investor in South Africa, both directly and indirectly. The 
United Kingdom South Africa Trade Association (UKSATA) estimates that almost 10% 
of all British overseas direct investment is in South Africa. the market value of which at 
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January 1982 was estimated at about f5,OOO million. Indirect (portfolio) investment was 
estimated at f6,OOO million, putting a total of eleven billion pounds investment at stake 
in South Africa. They suggest British investment accounts for almost 50% of total 
foreign investment in South Africa (8). More recent sources refer to a figure of around 
twelve billion pounds invested, though some suggest the direct investment has been 
reduced by up to half its value three years ago because of the drop in the value of the 
Rand (9). United States direct investment is put at $2.5 billion, though this is, in 
contrast with the UK, less than 1% of American overseas direct investment (10). 
South Africa’s reliance on trade and Western investment has led to demands for 
economic sanctions. However, despite frequently professed abhorrence of apartheid, the 
only significant economic sanctions imposed by governments up to 1985 were the United 
Nations Security Council Resolution 418, prohibiting arms sales to South Africa, and the 
OPEC oil boycott. Subsequently, events in South Africa have prompted other measures 
but these have been largely of a token nature or by countries with only minor interests 
in South Africa. Britain, for example, has placed a ban on Krugerrand sales. 
In considering international economic sanctions there is an important distinction 
between effectiveness and success. The distinction is based on the difference between 
the achievement of an economic impact and realising the objectives of the action. 
Writers on sanctions make the distinction to emphasise that effectiveness does not 
necessarily give rise to success, as in the case of American sanctions against Cuba (11). 
While it is generally assumed that effectiveness is necessary for success, some writers on 
sanctions question this. Galtung, for instance, observes that the goals in their use may 
involve punishment and the enforcement of international morality as well as changes in 
the boycotted country. In other words, sanctions have expressive and instrumental 
functions. So they may be successful without being effective. (12). 
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It follows then that measures which appear to be of a token nature can be 
important in a symbolic way. They lend support to declarations of abhorrence of 
apartheid. Yet while they may say something to the rest of the world they may not say 
enough to South Africa, the intended target. However, a range of sanctions are 
available. Token measures suggest the prospect of further, more substantial measures. 
But will they follow in South Africa’s case? 
Four principal arguments are advanced against economic sanctions on South 
Africa: the costs for those imposing them, that they would harm the blacks of South 
Africa most, doubts as to their effectiveness, and constructive engagement. Each is 
examined in turn as follows. 
The UK would incur some of the greatest costs in imposing sanctions. Estimates 
of these costs vary and, of course, their impact would depend upon whether a total 
boycott was imposed or selective sanctions. Margaret Thatcher has on many occasions 
spoken out against sanctions, though in June 1986 there was a perceptible change in 
attitude as pressure for sanctions mounted and the possibility of further UK sanctions 
has been admitted. 
Trade and investment involves an interdependence. The size of Britain’s 
investment in South Africa has already been shown to be substantial. British trade with 
South Africa is also important. In 1985, Britain’s visible exports to South Africa were 
worth f 1000 million, 1.28% of the total. Invisible earnings from South Africa - 
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shipping, banking interest and so on - was worth f 1,900 million in 1984. This was 2.3% 
of total British invisible credits (13). 
The costs of this loss of trade has been assessed in terms of increased 
unemployment. UKSATA suggest a figure as high as 250,000 additional unemployed in 
Britain with a boycott against South Africa (14). More recently, while the Prime 
Minister’s office has been quoting 120,000 and the Foreign and Commonwealth office 
50,000, Anti-Apartheid estimates that less than 10,000 UK jobs would be lost as a result 
of sanctions (15). Clearly some jobs would go with a total boycott of South Africa. 
GEC, for example, has a big contract to supply machinery for three South African 
power stations. Other companies in the power engineering industry, which accounts for 
a lot of UK trade with South Africa, would also suffer. However, job loss estimates do 
not seem very reliable and one recent source comments: “it is Britain’s invisible trades 
with South Africa - banking, shipping, investment, air travel - not UK jobs, which does 
seem to be the key issue. Forget the impact of losing f 1 billion of power station and 
chemical and whisky exports, and look to invisible earnings of f 1.9 billion last year, 
most of which were payments of interest, dividends and profits from British investments 
in South Africa” (16). 
UKSATA have also expressed a concern about questions of principle affecting 
the British National Interest arising from the use of economic sanctions, as well as the 
practical effects on the British economy. They suggest Britain’s role as a leading trading 
nation would be threatened, that “Companies are not the instruments of governments, 
they have no role to play in judging issues which only governments can resolve.” In 
other words, ‘don’t mix business and politics’ - social and political issues are the concern 
of governments not business. However, the idea of business and politics as two separate 
and autonomous areas should be recognised as notably suspect. The role of business (or 
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capital) in South Africa means that it is involved in - and some would argue responsible 
for - the political situation in South Africa. As one source puts it, referring to both 
business interests and business’ political lobbying to protect those interests: “The claim 
for the separateness of politics and business is never more frivolous or irrelevant than in 
its application to apartheid” (17). 
UKSATA’s arguments about South Africa offering Britain one of the best 
prospects for trade growth, about the high profits from South Africans operations, and 
on South Africa’s relatively ‘liberal’ exchange controls (permitting repatriation of profits 
and dividends without great restrictions), are all but negligible in South Africa’s current 
situation. They were, however, historically of great importance and explained much of 
Britain’s commitment to the stability of South Africa (and, thereby, the maintenance of 
apartheid). 
Britain’s trade with South Africa is important for Britain, or, at least, some 
sectors of British business. However, so is Britain’s trade with black Africa, which is 
greater. So Denis Healey, as British shadow foreign secretary, in demanding economic 
sanctions against South Africa, has commented: “the British Government will face a 
choice between losing its trade with black Africa, which is much greater than its trade 
with South Africa, and its investments in South Africa. They are likely to become 
dangerous and unprofitable so long as apartheid remains.” More recently, some black 
African states have threatened sanctions against the UK if action is not taken against 
South Africa (18). UKSATA point to South African trade with black Africa, though 
this seems small given the geographical proximity. Black Africa has also called for 
sanctions against South Africa, despite the considerable costs that would be incurred. 
These costs would not only involve probable loss of trade with South Africa but also 
difficulties for land-locked countries such as Lesotho and Swaziland, which would 
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probably be denied their supply routes through South Africa. International economic 
sanctions involve costs for the target of the action, but also the various participants. As 
the costs borne by the participants will vary, some suffering more than others, a further 
problem is agreeing and effecting compensation for those bearing greater costs. 
Increased aid to Africa may be necessary if major sanctions are imposed. 
Disinvestment, voluntarily or otherwise, is regarded by UKSATA and others as 
impracticable. Should companies be forced to withdraw they would have to sell their 
assets - always assuming they weren’t first expropriated by the South African 
Government and that capital would be permitted to be repatriated. This could 
presumably only be done at a considerable discount. It may be the likelihood of this 
that has prompted companies such as Metal Box, Pilkington and ABF to reduce their 
South African involvement, to ‘get out while the going’s good’, as it were. There has at 
least been a trend towards smaller shareholdings in South African operations, though this 
may also have something to do with a desire for lower visibility as much as less risk 
exposure. Moreover, the South African Government has encouraged reductions in 
foreign shareholdings to increase local ownership, financed, however, by Western capital. 
Indirect investment via Western banks, by the South African private sector and 
increasingly the state or semi-state sector, initiated by the Government, has been 
replacing direct investment via companies. This switch to indirect forms of investment 
is as susceptible as the direct forms, if not more so, as South Africa could simply choose 
not to repay loans should sanctions be imposed. 
This strategy of the South African Government is important because, as one 
source explains: “Its indirect nature depoliticises the European economic link with 
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apartheid by making it more diffuse and hard to identify” (19). It is also a major reason 
for the emphasis on banks and loans to South Africa by anti-apartheid protesters. 
Restricted access to strategic raw materials is a further consideration in the use 
of economic sanctions against South Africa and potentially a great cost for those 
imposing sanctions. UKSATA suggests access to raw materials from South Africa is as 
necessary to the industrial West as access to Middle Eastern oil, and “Without these raw 
materials vital sectors of British, West European, American and Japanese industry would 
be crippled and it follows that world trade would be seriously disrupted if 
South African raw materials were denied to the West as a result of a trade embargo.” 
As the South African Commercial Minister remarked, trade is “a two-way process.” And 
the importance of trading for South African raw materials should not be overlooked. 
The European Community imports something like 80% of its platinum, 91% of its 
chromium ore, 90% of its manganese and 36% of its vanadium from South Africa. An 
interruption in supplies would certainly push prices up. However, it has been argued 
that scarcity would encourage recycling, conservation and substitution and would not be 
sufficient to hold the West to ransom (20). 
So, in sum, the costs of imposing economic sanctions for the West, and the UK 
in particular, could be considerable. There would also be costs for the black African 
countries. Loss of trade and the knock-on effect for the domestic economies, loss of 
substantial investments as well as investment incomes, and the likely restricted access to 
key minerals, are major disincentives in considering such action. This is aside from the 
country’s perceived political and military significance as a bastion against communism in 
Africa and protector of the Cape sea route. This economic, political and strategic 
interdependence has always made the use of effective international economic sanctions 
by the West unlikely. However, the costs of sanctions could be borne without substantial 
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hardship, even assuming a total boycott. Depending on how involved the West became, 
the establishment of majority rule need not automatically mean an end to Western 
influence in South Africa. Certainly sanctions and the likely subsequent changes in 
South Africa are less easy to contemplate than maintenance of the status-quo. But can 
this position of inaction be defended, especially given the current level of violence in 
the country and the corresponding increase in pressure for sanctions? 
To trade with or invest in South Africa is viewed as supporting apartheid. 
Denial of trade and investment in South Africa is considered the most appropriate way 
in which the West can seek an end to apartheid. Yet such measures, the opponents of 
sanctions claim, would harm most those that they are intended to help. The second 
major argument against sanctions is that they would harm the blacks most. Given that it 
is claimed that the blacks of South Africa are in favour of sanctions, this argument can 
be usefully considered alongside the costs for those imposing sanctions. 
Sir Anthony Kershaw, as chairman of the House of Commons select committee 
on foreign affairs has commented in opposition to sanctions: “Cutting South Africa off 
from the rest of the world would not do anything about apartheid and would harm the 
.’ 
blacks.” To which the reply, as often expressed, was that the blacks are already I’ c 
suffering “beset with hunger and humiliations, as well as mortal danger from the police,” 
according to Mr Ramphal, the Commonwealth Secretary General. 
? 
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Some black leaders have declared themselves opposed to sanctions, such as Lucy 
Mvubelo, General Secretary of the National Union of Clothing Workers and Vice- 
President of the Trade Union Council of South Africa, and Chief Buthelezi, Chief 
i 
I 
Minister of the Zulu homeland, Kwa Zulu. Such government-appointed black leaders r i : 
are often viewed with suspicion, however. The ANC and many black union leaders 
‘* 
i 
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continue to call for sanctions and the Commonwealth Secretary General reports that the 
information reaching Commonwealth governments in Africa was that the black South 
Africans still wanted sanctions. There would, of course, be suffering for both South 
African blacks and those from neighboring countries that work in South Africa, but then 
it is said they are already suffering. This assumes that sanctions would be substantial 
and effective. The third argument against sanctions is that they wouldn’t work. 
The Effectiveness of Sanctions 
UKSATA claims there is no evidence that trade sanctions have been successful 
elsewhere. UKSATA and other opponents of sanctions point in particular to the alleged 
failure of sanctions against Rhodesia following UDI (Rhodesia’s unilateral declaration of 
independence). However, the limits to the effectiveness of sanctions against Rhodesia 
were largely as a result of sanction-busting by South Africa. In the case of sanctions 
against South Africa, there would be less scope for third party sanction-busting. 
Moreover, Rhodesia has become Zimbabwe, and sanctions played a part in this. One 
observer writing prior to the transition commented on sanctions against Rhodesia and 
others: “If agreements are reached, the more probable causes will not be economic but 
changed political bases for compromise or the imminence of military, rather than strictly 
economic, warfare” (21). In South Africa sanctions would be likely to achieve majority 
rule alongside the efforts of the ANC. 
South Africa’s response to sanctions would include countervailing measures, such 
as import substitution, rationing and the use of gold to pay for boycott-busting. The 
transantional socialist group Agenor has identified oil as South Africa’s jugular vein, as 
“one of the few commodities where South Africa is really vulnerable.” But even an 
(effective) oil boycott is rejectd by Spandau as unlikely to be successful (22). The bulk 
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of South Africa’s energy needs is supplied by coal. Coal supplies are estimated to last at 
least 130 years and less than one fifth of South Africa’s energy demands are met from 
oil. The transport sector however is 80% dependent on oil. But already a substantial 
proportion of this is provided by the Sasol oil from coal process. Investment in this 
technology continues and as an additional anticipatory measure, South Africa is 
stockpiling fuel (in 1978 it had at least 2Jr years’ supply at current rates of consumption). 
Spandau calculates that South Africa could withstand an oil boycott for at least eleven 
years through (25%) rationing, sanctioning by South Africa of its bunker oil sales, Sasol 
output, and the use of stockpiled crude. In the longer term, further investment would 
be made in the Sasol process and possibly non-conventional energy sources, fuel alcohols 
such as ethanol and methanol (Brazil is already using an ethanol-gasoline mixture for its 
motor fuel, derived from sugar-cane). South Africa has continued to obtain oil despite 
the OPEC boycott, by buying from Iran prior to the revolution and on the spot market 
subsequently (but it is estimated that the South African oil bill doubled in 1979). 
Gold is an alternative commodity which might be more effectively used with a 
program of selective sanctions. It accounts for around half of South Africa’s export 
earnings of foreign currency. A halving of the gold price would cut foreign earnings by 
a quarter and this sanction could not be easily avoided. Stockpiles held by the 
International Monetary Fund or the United States could be used to achieve this (23). 
The United Nations arms embargo, although mandatory, has proved ineffective, 
though as with oil, South Africa incurs considerable extra costs. Despite the boycott, 
South Africa continues to spend half its arms budget overseas (1983) - most notably with 
Israel - and has now become an arms exporter through the development of its own 
production facilities (24). Historically then, there is some support for the criticism of 
the effectiveness of sanctions. But, the critics ask, if sanctions are so ineffective, why 
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oppose their introduction? Further sanctions would, as earlier noted, be of symbolic 
importance, They can be successful without being effective and they should not be 
assessed in isolation from other efforts. Of course, if a role is to be acknolwedged for 
the ANC, this presumes this organisation and its aim of majority rule are favored by the 
West. 
The most convincing and prominent argument against sanctions was always the 
idea of bridge-building and change from within. This is known as constructive 
engagement. 
Constructive Enaaaement 
The forth and final major argument against sanctions is that ‘constructive 
engagemenet’ is more likely to be successful. This term has been attributed to Dr 
Chester Cracker, the United States Assistant Secretary of State for Africa, and has only 
come into use quite recently. However it describes a long-standing approach to the 
South African problem: the idea of reform from within and the ‘change through 
prosperity’ argument - the more business we do the more effectively we undermine 
apartheid. In foreign policy it is exemplified by the efforts (and failure) of the United 
States and the rest of the Contact Group (Britain, France, West Germany and Canada) to 
gently persuade rather than coerce South Africa to give up its illegal occupation of 
Namibia. It is the principal justification given for involvement with South Africa not 
only at a diplomatic or ‘political’ level, but also in terms of trade. So Chester Cracker 
has earlier said “The point is that among all the objectionable features of apartheid, 
there may be some that would logicaly go first if an open-ended process of change is to 
take root. The true friends of South Africa may be those who are prepared to talk now 
about short-term and intermediate goals consistent with the ultimate goal of a non-racial 
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society. Our role is to support and applaud progress that does occur while maintaining 
pressure for continued movement.” 
Accordinlgy, business interests describe their involvement in South Africa as a 
positive force for change. UKSATA observe “There is no evidence to suggest that either 
disinvestment, or a trade embargo, would help black South Africans. On the contrary, 
moderate black leaders want more, not less, foreign investment, in order to achieve the 
economic and political benefits they and their people desire.” They then suggest “British 
companies are a force for good.” 
Firms involved in South Africa will almost without exception defend their 
position on the basis of the constructive engagement argument. Sir Anthony Tuke, as 
Chairman of RTZ (and former Barclays Chairman), has commented “The question both 
we as investors and the people who will be affected by a new operation must ask is, 
whether the benefits of a major investment outweigh the disadvantages change may 
bring. We do believe that the advantages overwhelmingly outweigh the disadvantages as 
we see the rising standards of living in the areas where we operate. These are evidenced 
by the high quality of housing, education, health . ..‘I No doubt, until most recently, the 
White House preference for constructive engagement lent support to such a position. It 
is one that companies have consistently advanced. Nearly fifteen years ago First et al 
wrote on business involvement in South Africa: 
“In their reply to the suggestion that this involvement puts a special onus on 
British firms to help to end apartheid, businessmen generally give one of two 
answers: the first is that business and politics (like sport and politics) should not 
be mixed, and the second that apartheid may be objectionable, but that business 
is ‘doing its bit behind the scenes’ to change it; the alternative to this reform-by- 
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participation would, after all, be to try to bring down South Africa’s regime and 
consequently her economy. So let us opt for reform through business rather than 
for revolution” (25). 
However, they could find little evidence to support the claim that 
industrialisation was breaking down apartheid. More recently, but perhaps with more 
cause to do so, Spandau found there was evidence to suggest business involvement was 
improving the position of blacks, if not eroding apartheid. He identifies a closing of the 
gap between black and white wages and has high hopes for the small but growing black 
middle class (26). Similarly, another South African report, by the Centre for Business 
Studies, writing after the Wiehann and Riekert Commissions had advocated union 
recognition and other labor law changes whch were accepted by the Government, found 
further evidence of change for the better (27). And, indeed, it must be acknowledged 
that black union recognition is probably the most substantial change of the Botha 
government to date (28). 
An important feature of the constructive engagement argument is the role of 
codes of conduct for companies operating in South Africa. UKSATA, for example, in 
response to the criticism that British companies in South Africa exploit cheap labor with 
low wages and poor working conditions for blacks, reply “Of the many Blacks employed 
by British subsidiaries, 99% are paid above the lower rates set by the European Code of 
Conduct, and 92% are paid more than the higher rate set by that code.” 
The EEC Code of Conduct 
The EEC Code of Conduct replaced the UK Code of Practice established by the 
Government in 1974, and was adopted by the governments of the EEC in 1977. The 
22 
code is voluntary, but as the white paper observes “It is in the interests of companies 
themselves that they should maintain the best employment practices in South Africa and 
be seen to do so” (29). The provisions of the code refer to: 
1. Relations within the undertaking, particularly the recognition and encouragement 
of trade unions. 
2. Migrant labor - described as “an instrument of the policy of apartheid” - the 
effects of which employers “should make it their concern to alleviate.” 
3. Pay, which should exceed the Minimum Effective Level (MEL). 
4. Wage structure and black advancement, particularly equal pay for equal work and 
training programs for blacks. 
5. Fringe benefits; the improvement of employees living conditions, education and 
so on. 
6. Desegregation at work and equal working conditions. 
7. Reporting; companies should report annually on these provisions to their national 
government which should review progress made. 
Reporting requirements of comapnies vary according to the amount of equity 
held by a British company and the number of black employees. The code principally 
refers to those with more than 50 per cent of the equity of a South African company 
and employing 20 or more black Africans. The 1984 analysis of companies’ reports for 
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1982-83 is based on 142 reports from companies meeting these specifications, known as 
Category A. Twelve companies had not submitted reports and were expected to. These 
comapnies are listed and include John Brown, Gallaher and Trusthouse Forte. (It is 
noted however that some of these companies have stated it is not their policy to submit a 
report and inclusion in this list does not necessarily mean failure to comply with the 
standards suggested in the code.) Moreover, just as reporting is voluntary, so is 
compliance with the code’s provisions for those that do choose to report. Current 
government policy is not to identify firms reporting but failing to conform with the 
code’s provisions. However, as the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry reported in 
a written reply in the House “the vast majority of British companies already comply, and 
endeavour to meet the guidelines.” Mr Channon then expressed satisfaction with the 
operation of the code (30). 
Others are less happy with the operation of the code. While some of its 
provisions are seemingly quite far-reaching, they do not provide for ready 
implementation because they are too general and, of course, they are entirely voluntary. 
In other words, the code lacks teeth, Quinton Hazell, for example, reports to the 
Department of Trade and Industry, but in its submission in 1984 justified its failure to 
comply with the code by remarking that it is “a labour intensive company operating in a 
highly competitive market.” While Pritchard Services Group, in its 1985 submision, 
reveals that nearly 80 per cent of its 1,926 black employees were paid below the poverty 
line. Pay, of course, is effectively the only pass or fail criterion in the code. The 
penalty for failure to comply or report, because the code is not mandatory, is criticism 
in the press. 
The EEC code is largely concerned with employment practices. Most major 
American firms in South Africa are signatories of the Sullivan code, which is a little 
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wider in scope and has been expanded to include the provision that companies should 
lobby vigorously within South Africa against apartheid. Both codes have, until most 
recently, been useful in protecting firms from criticism at home. However, although 
they have raised black living standards, they have not really challenged apartheid. 
A Price to be Paid? 
Critics of constructive engagement see little evidence of it working, and 
particularly with the recent unrest, it has come to be seen as tacit support for apartheid. 
With the South African authorities unable to suppress challenges from the black majority 
within South Africa, the constructive engagement argument loses its credibility. The 
continued violence in South Africa demonstrates, in a dramatic and forceful way, the 
faiure of constructive engagement to achieve any real change. 
Corporate involvement in South Africa is defended by following the 
government’s line. As this has become untenable, and with domestic pressure from 
shareholders and consumer boycotts and other actions increasing, companies have started 
withdrawing from South Africa. American companies have been more active in this 
respect, particularly those companies with only a limited involvement (31). For many 
British companies withdrawal is less easy. there is, for example, evidence of a phased 
withdrawal by the parents of two of the biggest banks in South Africa, Barclays and 
Standard Chartered. However, a complete and immediate withdrawal, while apparently 
still possible, would be at a substantial loss (32). 
As the violence continues and the corresponding pressure for sanctions increases, 
it seems ever more likely that this is a price that must be paid by those Western 
businesses still operating in South Africa. If they choose to stay, or no longer have any 
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choice in the matter, they must accept that their assets could be lost under a government 
established by the ANC. As yet, the ANC has given little indication of likely support 
for capitalism in its meetings with representatives of South African business. South 
Africa under socialism may find it needs Western business as much as white South 
Africa needs it now. But given the role of business in apartheid to date, it is not 
unlikely that a majority rule South Africa would wish to exact a considerable price in 
return for renewed Western corporate involvement there. 
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